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Abstract
Blind delegation protocols allow a client to delegate a computation to a server so that the server
learns nothing about the input to the computation apart from its size. For the specific case of
quantum computation we know, from work over the past decade, that blind delegation protocols can
achieve information-theoretic security (provided the client and the server exchange some amount of
quantum information). In this paper we prove, provided certain complexity-theoretic conjectures
are true, that the power of information-theoretically secure blind delegation protocols for quantum
computation (ITS-BQC protocols) is in a number of ways constrained.
In the first part of our paper we provide some indication that ITS-BQC protocols for delegating
polynomial-time quantum computations in which the client and the server interact only classically
are unlikely to exist. We first show that having such a protocol in which the client and the server
exchange O(nd) bits of communication, implies that BQP ⊂ MA/O(nd). We conjecture that this
containment is unlikely by proving that there exists an oracle relative to which BQP 6⊂ MA/O(nd).
We then show that if an ITS-BQC protocol exists in which the client and the server interact only
classically and which allows the client to delegate quantum sampling problems to the server (such as
BosonSampling) then there exist non-uniform circuits of size 2n−Ω(n/log(n)), making polynomially-
sized queries to an NPNP oracle, for computing the permanent of an n× n matrix.
The second part of our paper concerns ITS-BQC protocols in which the client and the server
engage in one round of quantum communication and then exchange polynomially many classical
messages. First, we provide a complexity-theoretic upper bound on the types of functions that
could be delegated in such a protocol by showing that they must be contained in QCMA/qpoly ∩
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1 Introduction
An important area of research in modern cryptography is that of performing computations
on encrypted data. The general idea is that a client wants to compute some function f
on some input x, but lacks the computational power to do this in a reasonable amount of
time. Luckily, the client has access to a computationally powerful server (cloud, cluster
etc) which can compute f(x) quickly. However, because the computation might involve
sensitive or classified information, or the server could be compromised remotely, we would
like the input x to be hidden from the server at all times. The client can simply encrypt x,
but this raises the question: how can the server compute f(x) if it doesn’t know x? The
general problem of computing on encrypted data was first considered by Rivest, Adleman
and Dertouzos [52]. Since then, instances of this problem have appeared in many areas of
modern research including those of electronic voting, machine learning on encrypted data,
program obfuscation and others [22, 32, 11, 28, 37, 41].
It was shown in 2009, when Gentry produced the first fully homomorphic encryption
scheme, that performing classical computations on encrypted data is possible [29]. In
homomorphic encryption the client has a pair of efficient algorithms (Enc, Dec), which
respectively perform encryption and decryption, and which satisfy the property Dec(f, x,
Eval(f, Enc(x))) = f(x), for any function f from some set C. In other words, the server
evaluates f on the encrypted input Enc(x) using Eval and returns this to the client which
can then decrypt it to f(x). Of course, the server should not be able to infer information
about x from Enc(x), a condition which is typically expressed through the criterion of
semantic security [40]. If the set C contains all polynomial-sized circuits then the scheme
becomes a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, commonly abbreviated FHE. All known
FHE schemes are secure under cryptographic assumptions.
Computing on encrypted data becomes particularly interesting when the server is a
quantum computer. This is because efficient quantum algorithms have been found for various
problems which are believed to be intractable for classical computers. In fact, it has been
shown that if a classical computer and a quantum computer are both given black-box or
oracle access to certain functions, then the quantum computer exponentially outperforms
the classical computer [13, 55, 23, 5]. Classical clients would therefore be highly motivated
to delegate problems to quantum computers. However, ensuring the privacy of their inputs
is challenging. In particular, we’d have to solve the following problems:
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Devise an encryption scheme which is secure against quantum computers and does not
leak information to the server about the client’s input.
Ensure that the encryption scheme allows the client to recover the output of the compu-
tation from the result provided by the quantum server.
Ensure that the protocol is efficient for the client. Ideally, the number of rounds of
interaction between the client and the server as well as the client’s local computations,
should scale at most polynomially with the size of the input.
In spite of these stringent requirements, protocols that achieve these properties already
exist and are known collectively as delegated blind quantum computing schemes [26]. In
such protocols, a probabilistic polynomial-time client is able to delegate polynomial-time
quantum computations to a server in such a way that the client’s input (apart from an upper
bound on its size) is kept hidden from the server in an information-theoretic sense. All of
the above schemes require the client and the server to share at least one round of quantum
communication. Universal Blind Quantum Computation (UBQC), shown schematically in
Figure 1, is an example of such a protocol [19].
Figure 1 Universal Blind Quantum Computation [19]. In UBQC, a classical client augmented
with the ability to prepare single-qubit states sends these qubits to the server along with instructions
on how to entangle and measure them in order to perform a computation. The M(δi) indicate
measurement instructions and the bi indicate the server’s responses for these instructions (if he
follows the protocol, these responses would represent the outcomes of the measurements that the
client instructed him to perform).
The first blind delegation protocol was devised by Childs in [21], and since then these
protocols have been improved and extended in various works [47, 31, 44, 27, 45, 46, 39, 38].
UBQC and related protocols require the client and the server to exchange only one quantum
message, while the rest of the communication is classical [19, 9, 18]. This quantum message
(which is sent by the client to the server) consists of a tensor product of single-qubit states. As
such, the only quantum capability the client needs is the ability to prepare single-qubit states.
In this paper, we explore two questions pertaining to blind delegation protocols:
(1) Is there a scheme for blind quantum computing that is information-theoretically secure,
and that requires only classical communication between client and server?
(2) For schemes in which the client and the server are allowed one round of quantum
communication, which functions can the client delegate to the server while maintaining
information-theoretic security? In particular, could the client delegate the evaluation of
NP-hard functions?
We provide some indication, based on complexity-theoretic conjectures, that the answer to
the first question is no. In other words, provided these complexity-theoretic conjectures
hold, a classical client running in polynomial time and communicating only classically with a
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server cannot delegate arbitrary polynomial-time quantum computations to that server while
keeping its input hidden in an information-theoretic sense. Importantly, our result does not
contradict recent results on quantum fully homomorphic encryption with a classical client
[43, 15], since those schemes are based on cryptographic assumptions: we are interested only
in information-theoretic security.
In answer to the second question, we provide a complexity-theoretic upper bound on the
types of functions that can be evaluated by UBQC-type protocols (i.e. protocols in which
the client can send one quantum message to the server2). We show that, under plausible
complexity-theoretic assumptions, this upper bound prevents the client from delegating
NP-hard functions to the server. Thus, allowing for quantum communication between the
client and the server expands the set of functions that the client can delegate to the server
to include BQP, but not enough so as to include NP as well.
1.1 Main results
We phrase our results formally using the concept of a generalised encryption scheme (GES)
introduced by Abadi, Feigenbaum and Killian [8]. Roughly speaking, a GES is a protocol
between a probabilistic polynomial-time classical client and a computationally unbounded
server for computing on encrypted data. The client sends the server a description of some
function3 f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Using some polynomial-time algorithm denoted E, the client
encrypts its input x, and sends E(x) to the server. The server and the client then interact for
a number of rounds which is polynomial in the length of x. Finally, using a polynomial-time
decryption algorithm denoted D, the client decrypts the server’s responses and obtains f(x)
with probability 1/2 + 1/ poly(n). Importantly throughout the protocol, the server learns no
more than the length of x. Because the server is computationally unbounded, the scheme
requires information-theoretic security. Abadi et al. gave a complexity theoretic upper bound
on the types of functions that admit such a scheme. They showed that any function f that
the client could delegate in a GES must be contained in the class NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly.
The GES framework allows us to restate the questions we address in this paper as follows:
(1) Can we design a GES for delegating BQP functions? Note that, by the Abadi et al.
result, this is the same as asking whether BQP ⊂ NP/poly∩ coNP/poly. We will consider
two variants on the GES framework: one which allows the client to delegate sampling
problems to the server, and one in which the total communication between client and
server is bounded by O(nd), for some constant d > 0. For the former, we show that
having such a scheme for quantum sampling problems, like BosonSampling, implies
that circuits exist which can compute the permanent of a matrix more efficiently than
we believe is possible. For the latter, having a GES with bounded communication for
polynomial-time quantum computation implies that BQP ⊂ MA/O(nd), and we argue
that this containment is unlikely by providing an oracle separation between these classes.
(2) If we change the GES framework to allow one round of quantum communication between
the client and the server, what functions can the client delegate to the server? We
answer this question by “quantising” the Abadi et al. result and showing that such
2 In fact our result concerns protocols in which the client and the server start with one round of quantum
communication, followed by polynomially-many rounds of classical communication. In other words,
not only is there one quantum message from the client to the server, but the server is also allowed to
respond with a quantum message.
3 Unless otherwise specified, we restrict our attention to decision problems. This is why the function f
has the codomain {0, 1}.
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functions would be contained in QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly (a quantum analogue of
NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly). We also show that QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly is unlikely to
contain NP-hard functions.
The complete proofs for our results can be found in the full version of our paper [7].
1.1.1 Generalised encryption scheme for BQP decision problems
As we have mentioned, for the case of decision problems, Abadi et al. showed that the class
of problems that a client can delegate to a server using the GES framework is contained in
NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly. They also observed that if NP-hard functions could be delegated by
the client using a GES, then NP ⊂ NP/poly∩coNP/poly, and, in particular, NP ⊂ coNP/poly.
Yap showed that having such a containment leads to a collapse of the polynomial hierarchy
at the third level [58]. In other words, it seems unlikely that NP-hard problems would admit
a GES.
What about BQP-hard functions? The Abadi et al. result implies that having a GES for
BQP-hard functions leads to BQP ⊂ NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly. While we would like to argue,
similarly, that such a containment leads to a collapse of the polynomial hierarchy, even
BQP = P isn’t known to lead to such a collapse. We instead consider a modified GES in
which the total communication between the client and the server is upper bounded by a
polynomial of fixed degree, d > 0, in the size of the input4. In that case, it can be shown
that BQP ⊂ MA/O(nd) ∩ coMA/O(nd). We argue that this containment is unlikely based on
the following result:
I Theorem 1. For each d ∈ N, there exists an oracle Od such that BQPOd is not contained
in (MA/O(nd))Od .
Essentially, the theorem shows that relative to an oracle Od, there are problems that
can be solved by a polynomial-time quantum algorithm, but which a classical client cannot
delegate to a server in a GES with bounded communication. Since the oracle is parameterised
by d, we are in fact defining a family of oracles. The specific problem on which the oracle Od
is based is a version of Simon’s problem [55]. Simon’s problem is the following: for an input
of size n, and given oracle access to a function g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n that is guaranteed to be
either an injective function, or a 2-to-1 and periodic function5, the task is to decide which is
the case. Simon provided a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for solving this problem,
thus showing that it belongs to BQP (relative to the function oracle). For the case in which
one should accept when the function is 2-to-1, the problem can be shown to be outside of
MA (relative to the function oracle). As such, Simon’s problem provides an oracle separation
between BQP and MA.
In Simon’s original construction, the oracle function is the same for all inputs of size n.
Note that, this version of the problem can be solved with one bit of advice: for all inputs of
size n, the advice bit simply specifies whether the function is 1-to-1 or 2-to-1 and periodic.
Therefore such a setup would not be useful in our case. For this reason, in our proof of
Theorem 1, the function that the oracle provides access to is input-dependent. The problem
we define, relative to this oracle, is again to decide whether the function is 1-to-1 or the
function is 2-to-1 and periodic. However, we can show that, by considering a sufficiently
4 Note that we impose no such restriction on the running time of the client.
5 In other words, there exists a period s ∈ {0, 1}n, s 6= 0n, such that for all x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, x 6= y, it is the
case that g(x) = g(y) iff. x = s⊕ y.
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large domain for these functions – in other words, by letting g : {0, 1}nD → {0, 1}nD for
some D > d – the problem is not contained in (MA/O(nd))Od , but is nevertheless contained
in BQP. The proof uses a diagonalisation argument and can be found in the full version of
our paper [7].
Unfortunately, the same oracle cannot be used to separate BQP from NP/poly. This is
because D is a function of d; to prove a separation with respect to NP/poly, where the length
of the advice string can be any polynomial, we would have to find an oracle that works for
all possible values of d. It would be interesting to see whether the oracle that Raz and Tal
[51] recently used to prove a separation between BQP and PH could also be used in order to
separate BQP from NP/poly, or even from PH/poly. We leave this as an open problem.
One can argue that oracle results do not constitute compelling evidence on the relationships
between complexity classes. For example, it has been known for a while that there exist
oracles O1, O2 such that PO1 6= NPO1 but PO2 = NPO2 , and that, while IP = PSPACE, there
is an oracle such that IPO 6= PSPACEO. Nonetheless, oracles allow us to study the query
complexity of problems in different models of computation. In fact, there are situations in
practice where computer programs are restricted to making black-box calls to functions in
order to determine their properties [36]. Apart from this, oracle results have also inspired
a number of important developments in algorithms and complexity theory6. For more
arguments concerning the usefulness of oracle results, see Section 1.3 of [2].
1.1.2 Generalised encryption scheme for BQP sampling problems
We consider what would happen if we have a generalised encryption scheme which allowed
a client to delegate a sampling problem, such as BosonSampling, to the server. Boson-
Sampling, defined by Aaronson and Arkhipov in [6], is essentially the problem of simulating
the statistics of photons (bosons) passing through a linear optics network. One starts with a
configuration of identical photons in known locations (referred to as modes). The photons
then pass through the linear optics network, which consists of optical elements (beamsplitters
and phase shifters). Finally, one performs a measurement to determine the new locations of
the photons in the output modes of the system. The reason this is referred to as a sampling
problem is because we have a probability distribution over the different configurations of
photons in the output modes. In exact BosonSampling, which is the problem we consider,
the task is to produce a sample from that probability distribution. Aaronson and Arkhipov
showed that the probability of observing a particular configuration of photons is proportional
to the squared permanent of a matrix that can be obtained efficiently from the description of
the optical network. They also showed that no polynomial-time probabilistic algorithm can
sample from this distribution, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses at the third level [6].
As such, while a quantum computer could simulate the optical network and sample from
the target distribution in polynomial time, it seems unlikely that classical computers could
do the same.
Sampling problems, like BosonSampling, are of interest because of their potential use
in demonstrating quantum computational supremacy [35]. This entails having a quantum
device perform a computational task that no classical computer would be able to reproduce
efficiently. Sampling problems are natural candidates for this task for two main reasons.
Firstly, many of the quantum sampling problems that have been considered could in principle
be performed on a small-scale quantum computer having up to (or on the order of) 100
6 A notable example is the fact that Simon’s oracle separation between BPP and BQP led to Shor’s
algorithm for factoring and computing the discrete logarithm [54]
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qubits and not requiring fault-tolerance [50]. Secondly, it has been shown that having a
polynomial-time classical algorithm that can sample from the distribution of the quantum
sampling problem leads to a collapse of the polynomial hierarchy. Contrast this to tasks such
as factoring for which the existence of an efficient classical algorithm is not known to lead to
any “disastrous” complexity-theoretic consequences.
Given that sampling problems are primarily considered in the context of demonstrating
quantum computational supremacy, one could ask why a client would like to delegate such a
problem to the server via a GES. Firstly, all existing schemes for blind delegated quantum
computation allow the client to delegate both decision and sampling problems [26]. It is
therefore natural to ask whether such a scheme, involving only classical communication, can
also exist. Secondly, there is currently no known way for a classical client to efficiently certify
whether the server has sampled from the correct distribution (at least with an information-
theoretic guarantee). In fact, in certain cases the client would require exponentially many
samples from the server in order to perform this verification [34]. However, if a GES for
quantum sampling problems existed, the client might be able to leverage it in order to
perform the certification, in the same way that many delegated quantum computation
protocols leverage blindess to achieve verifiability [30]. Finally, due to the equivalence
between sampling and searching shown in [3], our result holds if we substitute sampling
problems with search problems.
In a GES for exact BosonSampling, the client’s input would be a description of a linear
optics network7. The client would like to delegate to the server the task of sampling from the
BosonSampling distribution associated with this network, while keeping the description
of the network hidden from the server. In other words, upon interacting with the server
and decrypting its responses, the client should obtain a sample from the BosonSampling
distribution. At the same time, the server learns at most an upper bound on the size of the
network. We show the following:
I Theorem 2. If exact BosonSampling admits a GES, then for any matrix
X ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×n, there exist circuits of size 2n−Ω(
n
log n ), making polynomially-sized queries
to an NPNP oracle, for computing the permanent of X.
Computing the permanent of a matrix is a problem known to be #P-hard. By Toda’s
theorem, this means that if computing the permanent were possible at any level of the
polynomial hierarchy, the hierarchy would collapse at that level [56]. Moreover, the best known





Prior to that, the leading algorithm for computing the permanent was Ryser’s algorithm,
developed over 50 years ago, which requires O(n2n) arithmetic operations [53]. We conjecture
that the circuits of Theorem 2 do not exist and, thus, that there can be no GES for
BosonSampling.
1.1.3 Quantum generalised encryption scheme
While having a GES for delegating BQP computations seems unlikely, we know that giving
the client some minimal quantum capabilities removes this limitation: schemes such as
UBQC exist which allow for the information-theoretically secure blind delegation of quantum
7 In principle, one could also specify the configuration of the photons in the input modes as part of the
client’s input. Equivalently, however, one can always initialise the input modes to some fixed initial
state, and produce whichever starting state is in fact desired by altering the linear optics network.
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computations. In the spirit of the Abadi et al. result, it is natural to consider quantum
generalised encryption schemes (or QGES), in which the client is no longer classical, and
investigate the complexity-theoretic upper bounds on functions that admit such a protocol.
For the QGES, we are still assuming information-theoretic security and that the encryption
scheme leaks at most the size of the input. However, unlike the GES, the client is now
assumed to be a quantum computer performing polynomial-time computations8. Additionally,
the client and the server perform one round of quantum communication at the beginning of
the protocol. The rest of the communication is classical.
We impose one other restriction on the QGES, known as offline-ness. Roughly speaking,
an offline protocol is one in which the client does not need to commit to any particular input
(of a given size), after having sent the quantum message to the server. The quantum message
only depends on the size of the input. We note that offline-ness is a property which UBQC
and all other currently known blind quantum computing protocols share. From a practical
perspective, this presents the client with the option of sending the first quantum message
to the server and deciding at a later time on which input the server should perform the
computation. One could imagine, for instance, that the client and the server have access
to a quantum channel for a limited amount of time. In practice, such a situation can occur
if the communication between the parties is mediated by a satellite, as is the case with
satellite-based quantum-key distribution [42]. In this case, the satellite is in the line of sight
of the two parties for only a few minutes at a time. Our result is the following:
I Theorem 3. The class of functions that a client can delegate to a server in an offline
QGES is contained in QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly.
Note that the class QCMA/qpoly∩ coQCMA/qpoly can be seen as a quantum analogue of the
class NP/poly∩coNP/poly which we encounter in the GES case. We therefore view Theorem 3
as a “quantisation” of the Abadi et al. bound on the power of generalised encryption schemes.
Again, in the spirit of the Abadi et al. result, one can ask whether NP-complete functions
are contained in QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly. In other words: does giving quantum
capabilities to the client increase the class of functions that it can securely delegate so that
this class contains NP? We give an indication that the answer is no:
I Theorem 4. NP ⊂ QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly implies coNPNPNP ⊆ NPNP
PromiseQMA
.
Note that if PromiseQMA in the above expression were replaced with NP, this would imply a
collapse of the polynomial hierarchy at the third level. Our result is as close to a collapse of
the polynomial hierarchy as one can reasonably hope to get, given a quantum hypothesis.
Hence, while a QGES does allow the client to delegate BQP computations, it seems to be no
more useful than the regular GES for delegating NP-hard functions.
One could ask why we would even be interested in delegating NP-hard problems to a
quantum computer, given that we do not expect quantum computers to be able to solve
such problems in polynomial time [1]. First of all, from a theoretical perspective, note
that in the QGES formalism we are not limiting the server to polynomial-time quantum
computations, but instead assuming that it has unbounded computational power. Therefore,
the way to view this result is not as “how can a client blindly delegate the evaluation of
NP-hard functions to a quantum computer?” but as “can quantum communication help in
blindly delegating the evaluation of NP-hard functions to an unbounded server?”.
From a practical perspective, while we do not believe that quantum computers can solve
NP-complete problems in polynomial time, they could, in principle, solve such problems
quadratically faster than classical computers, thanks to Grover’s algorithm [33]. Even
8 It should be noted that our upper bound on the power of QGES schemes also holds if the client is
restricted to BPP computations (as is the case in UBQC), since BPP ⊆ BQP.
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though the speedup of Grover’s algorithm is only quadratic, from (say) 2n to 2n/2, our result
is only concerned with the length of the computation performed on the client side, and
therefore applies to Grover’s algorithm just as it would to a quantum algorithm achieving
exponential speedup. In fact, as is mentioned in [4], there are NP-complete problems for
which quantum computers provide a superpolynomial speedup, at least with respect to the
best known classical algorithms. Our no-go theorem indicates that clients cannot exploit such
speedups by delegating the computation to the server, even when allowing some quantum
communication, if we also want to keep their inputs hidden in an information-theoretic sense.
Proofs of these results can be found in the full version of our paper [7].
1.2 Related work
As mentioned, the problem of computing on encrypted data was first considered by Rivest,
Adleman and Dertouzos [52], which then led to the development of homomorphic encryption
and eventually to fully homomorphic encryption with Gentry’s scheme [29]. Since then there
have been many other FHE protocols relying on more standard cryptographic assumptions
and having more practical requirements [17, 16, 57].
While FHE is similar to the GES in many respects, there are also significant differences.
For starters, FHE protocols have only one round of interaction between the client and the
server, whereas a GES allows for polynomially many rounds. Additionally, the GES assumes
the server is computationally unbounded and hence requires information-theoretic security. In
contrast, FHE relies on computational security. More precisely FHE schemes have semantic
security against polynomial-time (quantum) algorithms [29].
The problem of quantum computing on encrypted data was introduced by Childs [21]
and Arrighi and Salvail [12]. Further development eventually led to UBQC [19, 9] and a
scheme of Broadbent [18]. The latter was followed by the construction of the first schemes
for quantum fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE) [20, 24]. For a review of blind quantum
computing and related protocols see [26].
In the QFHE schemes of [20, 24], the server is a polynomial-time quantum computer
and the client has some quantum capabilities of its own, although it is not able to perform
universal quantum computations. Both the size of the exchanged messages and the number
of operations of the client are polynomial in the size of the input. More recently, QFHE
schemes have been proposed in which the client is completely classical [43, 15]. Similar
to FHE, these protocols rely on computational assumptions for security [10] and involve
one round of back and forth interaction between the client and the server. QFHE with
information-theoretic security (and a computationally unbounded server) has been considered
by Yu et al. in [59], where it is shown that it is impossible to have such a scheme for arbitrary
unitary operations (or even arbitrary reversible classical computations). This result was later
reproved by Newmann and Shi using quantum random-access codes [49]. In relation to our
work, QFHE with information-theoretic security can be viewed as a one-round QGES in
which the server responds with a quantum message. The complexity-theoretic upper bound
we prove for QGES computable functions would then apply to QFHE as well (provided that
in QFHE we only leak the size of the input to the server), since our proof allows a quantum
message from the server just as well as a classical message.
The possibility of a classical client delegating a blind computation to a quantum server
was considered by Morimae and Koshiba [48]. They showed that such a protocol in which
the client leaks no information about its input to the server and there is only one round of
interaction leads to BQP ⊆ NP, considered an unlikely containment. We consider the more
general setting of a GES for BQP functions, where the number of rounds can be polynomial
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in the size of the input and we allow the encryption to leak the size of the input. In fact, the
question of whether a GES, as defined in Abadi et al. [8], can exist for quantum computations
was raised before by Dunjko and Kashefi [25].
1.3 Future work
As we remarked in Section 1.1, in the case of decision problems, the existence of a GES with
bounded communication, for polynomial-time quantum computations, leads to the inclusion
BQP ⊂ MA/O(nd). We argue that this containment is unlikely based on the existence of an
oracle separating the two complexity classes. A natural extension of this result would be to
prove an oracle separation between BQP and NP/poly. This would provide more compelling
evidence that a GES for quantum computations cannot exist.
In the case of sampling problems, we showed that a GES for BosonSampling implies the
existence of circuits of size 2n−Ω(
n
log n ), making polynomially-sized queries to an NPNP oracle,
for computing matrix permanents. Can this result be strengthened so as to provide circuits
for computing matrix permanents that would be ruled out by the strong exponential-time
hypothesis? Alternatively, could one use other quantum sampling problems (such as random
circuit sampling or IQP problems [35]) to show that having a GES for such a problem leads
to a collapse of the polynomial hierarchy?
We also defined the QGES, which extends the GES by allowing the client to send one
quantum message to the server, and gave an upper bound for the set of functions that can be
delegated using an offline version of such a scheme. The immediate question one could ask
is: what upper bound can we give for an online QGES? A related question is: what upper
bound can we give for a QGES that allows all of the communication between the client and
the server to be quantum? The difficulty in answering both of these questions is that the
offline property of the QGES is what allowed us to relate the set of functions that can be
delegated to advice classes. Without this property, it seems that a different approach would
be needed to provide a complexity-theoretic upper bound.
Another direction that can be explored has to do with the size of the quantum communic-
ation between the client and the server. In a QGES in which the client’s quantum message
is logarithmic or poly-logarithmic in the size of the input (while the classical communication
is still polynomial), is it still possible to delegate BQP functions to the server? Of course,
this question only makes sense if we assume that the client is not able to perform BQP
computations itself.
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